Security: eval() on marketplace data and LLM output enables code injection

## Security Concerns Two separate code injection vulnerabilities found during security audit: ### 1. eval() on Marketplace-Sourced Data (Supply Chain Risk) **File:** `superagi/controllers/knowledges.py` The `vector_ids` field from marketplace-sourced knowledge is evaluated with `eval()` during knowledge uninstall operations. A malicious marketplace knowledge package could contain crafted `vector_ids` that execute arbitrary code when the knowledge is uninstalled. Additionally, agent configurations (`goal`, `instruction`, `constraints`) are processed with `eval()`: - `superagi/helper/resource_helper.py` **Fix:** Replace `eval()` with `json.loads()` or `ast.literal_eval()`. ### 2. eval() on LLM Output in Task Processing **Files:** - `superagi/jobs/agent_executor.py` - `output_handler.py:149,180` - `eval(assistant_reply)` on LLM response - `superagi/lib/queue_step_handler.py:79` - `eval(assistant_reply)` for task queue The `JsonCleaner` used before eval() provides no real sanitization - it just extracts text between `[` and `]` brackets. An indirect prompt injection in processed data could cause the LLM to generate malicious Python code that gets executed. **Example payload:** `[__import__('os').system('id')]` **Fix:** Replace `eval()` with `json.loads()`: ```python import json tasks = json.loads(assistant_reply) ``` ### Note I attempted to use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting but it appears to be disabled for this repository. Consider enabling it at Settings → Code security → Private vulnerability reporting. --- *Discovered during security audit by Lighthouse Research Project (https://lighthouse1212.com)*