---
title: Flux Party
type: party
status: deregistered
country: AU
website: https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://voteflux.org/
logo: /assets/org-logos/flux.svg
summary: An Australian political party that uses Issue-Based Direct Democracy (IBDD)
  to let constituents direct how elected representatives vote in parliament.
concepts:
- issue-based-direct-democracy
- liquid-democracy
- prediction-markets
events:
- date: '2016-01-01'
  title: Registered as a federal political party, promoting a novel platform of direct
    digital democracy via app-based voting
  url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flux_(political_party)
  quote: Flux parties were registered
  proof_level: high
  url_checked: '2026-08-10'
  notable: true
contributors:
- Charlie
---

![Flux Party logo](flux-mark.svg)

Flux was an Australian political party built around the concept of Issue-Based Direct Democracy (IBDD). Rather than a representative voting on their own judgement, Flux aimed to have elected members vote in parliament according to the aggregated preferences of their constituents, expressed through a digital platform and a market for votes.

The party was founded by Max Kaye and Nathan Spataro. It fielded Senate candidates in multiple federal elections and operated at the state level. The federal party was deregistered by the AEC in 2022.

## Philosophical foundations

IBDD rests on two interconnected critiques of existing democratic systems, both drawn from Max Kaye's presentations of the model.

### The selectorate problem

The first critique draws on what political scientists call *selectorate theory* (popularised by CGP Grey's "Rules for Rulers"). Every ruler — dictator or prime minister — must maintain a coalition of key supporters ("keys") who control the means of coercion, production, or legitimacy. A ruler who fails to keep those keys satisfied will be replaced. This structural dynamic means corruption is not a personal failing but an institutional requirement: the system selects for leaders willing to pay their keys, regardless of their stated intentions.

In a democracy, the keys are more numerous (parties need enough votes to win), which forces rulers to keep society productive enough to tax. This is democracy's advantage over dictatorship. But the underlying structure is the same: legislators give favourable treatment to interest groups and donors not out of personal greed but because failing to do so means losing power to someone who will. Corruption, on this account, is the expression of authority — to end corruption you must redesign the structure of authority itself.

### The fallibilism problem

The second critique draws on Karl Popper and David Deutsch's concept of *fallibilism*. Democracy conventionally asks "who should rule?" — but this is the wrong question, because it presupposes an authoritative source of good policy. No such source exists. The better question, in Popper's framing, is: *how do we best detect and eliminate bad policy without violence?*

Good explanations — and by extension, good policies — are *hard to vary*: they make specific, testable claims that would break if the underlying reasoning were wrong. An easy-to-vary explanation (like a myth that can be patched to fit any evidence) is a sign the theory doesn't correspond to reality. A political system that wants to improve over time must be designed to surface and eliminate bad policy, not to implement the will of an authority or even the will of the majority.

Direct democracy fails this test: it codifies popular opinion, which has no necessary relationship to well-constructed explanations. IBDD is an attempt to design for knowledge-creation instead.

### Static majoritarianism as the core problem

Both problems converge on what Kaye identifies as the central structural evil: *static majoritarianism*. Once a coalition wins a majority, it controls all decisions until the next election. The minority has no leverage on any issue. There is no opportunity cost between issues — a deal to support one policy costs nothing relative to another. This suppresses criticism, makes proposing new ideas a privilege of the majority, and creates no feedback mechanism for eliminating bad policy between elections.

Liquid democracy and representative democracy share this flaw — both end with a fixed group of voters aligned the same way across all issues.

## How IBDD works

IBDD replaces the binary vote with a market for political expression. The system has two token types:

**Votes** are issued to all participants equally per issue. If unused, they are converted to political capital and returned to the pool.

**Political capital** (liquidity tokens) can be traded for votes and vice versa while an issue is live. The exchange rate is supply-and-demand based: trading votes on a popular issue yields more political capital than trading on an unpopular one.

The key mechanism is **opportunity cost between issues**. Because political capital spent on one issue cannot be spent on another, every participant faces a real tradeoff: how much do you care about this issue relative to others? Someone who cares deeply about housing policy and little about trade law can trade their trade votes for political capital and spend it on housing. The result is that political influence flows toward the issues people actually care about most, rather than being distributed equally and wasted.

Political capital is also required to **propose new legislation**, creating a tradeoff between proposing and voting.

**Political capital is acquired in three ways**: a signup bonus on joining; a basic income distribution (~30% inflation rate on the PC token supply, distributed equally to all voters); and by opting out of issues — unused votes go into an auction market, with proceeds distributed proportionally to those who chose not to vote on that issue.

**Redistribution:** The inflation mechanism prevents long-term accumulation. Participants who disengage for a period accumulate a reserve of political capital for when they return, rather than simply being excluded.

**Delegation** works proportionally: participants can split their resources across multiple delegates (provided the total does not exceed 100%), with any remainder returned to the delegator. Delegation can be revoked at any time.

## Properties and predictions

By Kaye's account, IBDD has several properties that existing democratic systems lack:

- **No permanent authority.** Decisions change issue by issue; no individual or coalition controls the outcome across all issues.
- **Corruption is expensive.** Defending bad policy requires continuously spending political capital. A group that passes harmful legislation must keep spending to prevent it being reversed, while those harmed by it have strong incentive to spend to remove it.
- **Political autonomy for minorities.** Communities can concentrate their capital on the issues they care most about. They don't need a majority's permission to advance policy that doesn't harm others.
- **Incentivises specialisation.** It is worth becoming genuinely expert on an issue because that expertise translates to effective political capital use — unlike in representative democracy, where a single citizen's knowledge has near-zero electoral impact.
- **Scales without dilution.** As population grows, so does specialisation; there is no fixed number of representatives being divided among more people.

> *"IBDD has never been put forward as 'the answer' or a panacea. Rather, it's the seed that can flower into a system that continuously improves without need for massive social organisation."* — Max Kaye

## Links

- Website: [voteflux.org](https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://voteflux.org/) *(archived)*
- Wikipedia: [Flux (political party)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flux_(political_party))
- Video: [The Case for Flux — Max Kaye, June 2017](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zq25UXc_ONg) *(primary source for the philosophical sections above; transcript is AI-generated and may contain transcription errors)*
- Essay: [IBDD and Popper's Criterion — Max Kaye, May 2017](http://xk.io/2017/05/27/ibdd-and-poppers-criterion/) *(Max Kaye's written account of the epistemological argument)*

## Podcast

Designing Open Democracy recorded a podcast episode with Ben Ballingall, Victoria representative of the Flux Party, on 2020-02-11.
[Listen on Apple Podcasts](https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/talk-ben-ballingall-about-flux-party-issue-based-direct/id1492656241?i=1000465446730)

- [Talk with Ben Ballingall about Flux Party and IBDD](../../blog/posts/2020-02-13-podcast.md) — the main conversation: Brexit as a failure case, IBDD vs citizen juries, corruption resistance, the electoral path
- [Bonus content with Ben Ballingall](../../blog/posts/2020-02-29-podcast.md) — extended warm-up notes focused on how the Flux system works

## See also

- [Issue-Based Direct Democracy](../concepts/issue-based-direct-democracy.md)
- [Liquid Democracy](../concepts/liquid-democracy.md)
- [Prediction Markets](../concepts/prediction-markets.md)
- [MiVote](mivote.md)
- [Evaluating Democracy Reform Proposals](../../blog/posts/2018-05-03.md) — Nick Merange's comparative scoring of Flux, MiVote, Online Direct Democracy, and Citizens' Juries
- [Max Kaye's response to the evaluation](../../blog/posts/2018-05-03-Max.md)
- [Deregistration of Flux Party by the Australian Electoral Commission](../../blog/posts/2022-08-22.md) — Nick Merange, August 2022