---
title: Server API
description: HTTP API reference — authentication, routes, the SSE streaming protocol, and DTO type imports.
---

The PenguinHarness server exposes a same-origin HTTP API used by the bundled Web App and by any other HTTP client. This page is the reference: authentication, route tables, and the SSE streaming protocol. For starting the server, see the [Quickstart](/quickstart).

## Overview

- Stack: Hono + @hono/node-server, requires Node >= 24;
- Storage: SQLite (built-in `node:sqlite`, WAL mode) holds only indexes and aggregates — users, auth sessions, Project authorization, Agent / Session indexes, usage, UI preferences, error records, and Schedule state; all Agent, Trace, and Workspace data stays as files under `~/.penguin/data`, shared with the CLI / SDK — see the [Configuration Reference](/configuration);
- Binding: defaults to `127.0.0.1:7364`, adjustable via the `PORT` / `HOST` environment variables;
- Request bodies: writes accept JSON only (Content-Type check, one of the CSRF defenses), capped at 20MB — counted as the body is read, so a request that declares no length (chunked) is capped just the same;
- Errors share a single shape:

```text
{ "error": { "code": "<machine-readable code>", "message": "<user-facing text>" } }
```

## Source layout

```text
packages/server/src
├── index.ts / config.ts / app.ts   # startup entry · env config · Hono assembly (createApp binds no port — testable)
├── api/types.ts                    # the outward DTO contract (type-only import via the "./api" subpath)
├── auth/                           # scrypt passwords, admin seeding, cookie sessions, auth middleware
├── db/                             # node:sqlite connection, schema SQL, one repo per table
├── http/                           # error bodies, request validation, SSE adapter, routes/ all route groups
├── runtime/                        # session-manager (runtime driving) · channel (SSE ring buffer)
│                                   # approvals · usage-recorder · scheduler · title-generator
└── services/                       # authorization rules, TOML/YAML config IO, Session/Trace/usage/snapshot services
```

## Authentication

- Cookie session: `penguin_session` (HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax), valid for 7 days with sliding renewal;
- Passwords are stored as scrypt hashes; the server keeps only the sha256 of the session token, never the plaintext;
- No open registration: the built-in admin `admin` is seeded at startup with a random initial password (of the form `penguin-1234`) printed once to the server console — `PENGUIN_SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD` pins it for automation — and all other accounts are created by an admin;
- Same-origin only — no CORS middleware is enabled.

```bash
# Use the initial password printed at first start (or your changed one).
curl -c cookies.txt -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"userId":"admin","password":"penguin-1234"}' \
  http://127.0.0.1:7364/api/auth/login
```

## Route Reference

### Auth and Account

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| POST | /api/auth/login | Log in: `{userId, password}` → `{user}` |
| POST | /api/auth/logout | Log out, returns 204 |
| GET | /api/me | Current user info |
| PUT | /api/me/password | Change password: `{oldPassword, newPassword}` |
| GET | /api/me/prefs | Read UI preferences |
| PUT | /api/me/prefs | Write UI preferences (shallow merge) |

### User Administration (admin only)

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | /api/admin/users | List users |
| POST | /api/admin/users | Create a user: `{userId, password}` |
| POST | /api/admin/users/:userId/password | Reset a password (invalidates all of that user's login sessions) |
| DELETE | /api/admin/users/:userId | Delete a user |

In desktop mode (the server spawned by the desktop app) the whole surface answers `403` with code `desktop_single_user`: the desktop app is single-user, so user management is disabled — existing users in the data root are untouched.

### Server Settings (admin only)

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | /api/admin/settings | Server-global settings: `{settings: {proxyForApp, proxyForAgent, proxyUrl}}` |
| PUT | /api/admin/settings | Update settings (fields optional; omitted fields keep their current value), returns the full updated settings |

The proxy settings are two independent switches sharing one optional explicit address; changes take effect for newly initiated connections/spawns immediately — no restart:

- `proxyForApp` ("application uses the proxy", default on) governs the server's own outbound traffic (LLM requests, the update check, image fetches): on with `proxyUrl` set → that address for both http and https, **taking precedence over the proxy environment variables** — no environment variable needs to be configured; on without an address → the environment variables HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY / NO_PROXY (both spellings); off → always direct.
- `proxyForAgent` ("agent environment uses the proxy", default on) governs agent command subprocess environments: on with `proxyUrl` set → `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` (plus lowercase twins) are injected as that address together with the merged NO_PROXY, overriding inherited values; on without an address → the host environment passes through unchanged; off → the proxy variables are stripped (NO_PROXY is kept).
- `proxyUrl` (default null = follow the environment variables) is the shared explicit address. Validation on PUT: the value is trimmed; empty or null clears the address; accepted forms are `http://host[:port]`, `https://host[:port]`, and bare `host[:port]` (normalized to `http://host[:port]` — only normalized values are stored, and the response echoes the stored form); anything else is `400` with code `invalid_proxy_url`, and the rejected PUT writes nothing.

In every on-state the effective NO_PROXY always includes `localhost,127.0.0.1,::1` (loopback is never proxied).

### Version and Self-Update

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | /api/version | Running release identity: `{version, buildDate}` (`buildDate` is the running version's release date, stamped at build time — no network; null in a dev/source build or a release that predates the stamping) |
| GET | /api/version/update-check | Compares the newest GitHub release with the running version: `{currentVersion, latestVersion, updateAvailable, releaseUrl, publishedAt, checkedAt, disabled?, error?}`; `?force=1` (the manual "check for updates" action) bypasses the TTL cache, and the outcome is cached as usual |
| POST | /api/version/update | **Admin only.** Runs the CLI self-update (`penguin update --yes`) on the server host: `{status, output, needsRestart}` |

`update-check` is the server's only outbound internet call and is strictly fail-soft: a failed lookup still returns 200 with `error` set (`network` / `rate_limited` / `bad_response`) and `latestVersion: null`, results are cached in memory (success 1 h, failure 10 min), and setting `PENGUIN_UPDATE_CHECK=off` disables the lookup entirely (`disabled: true`, no network call). The update `status` is `updated` (restart the service to run the new version), `failed`, or `unsupported` — the latter both when the server was not started via `penguin server|web` (`reason: "not_launched_via_cli"`) and when the CLI refuses (source checkout, unrecognized install layout, Windows); `output` carries the tail of the CLI's own output.

### Projects and Members

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | /api/projects | Projects visible to the current user |
| POST | /api/projects | Create a Project |
| DELETE | /api/projects/:projectId | Delete a Project |
| GET | /api/projects/:projectId/members | List members |
| POST | /api/projects/:projectId/members | Add a member: `{userId}` |
| DELETE | /api/projects/:projectId/members/:userId | Remove a member |

Member writes are owner-only. The member routes also answer `403 desktop_single_user` in desktop mode (see User Administration above).

### Models

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | /api/projects/:projectId/models | List models (api_key masked) |
| PUT | /api/projects/:projectId/models | Full-table replace, keyed by `(provider, modelId)` |
| POST | /api/projects/:projectId/models/test | Connectivity test: `{provider, modelId, …}` → `{ok, latencyMs?, message?}` |

Every endpoint that names a model takes the complete `(provider, modelId)` pair. Nothing is inferred: a request carrying only one half is a 400, never a lookup. Where the reference itself is optional (Session creation, Schedules), omitting both halves selects the Project's default model.

`PUT /models` also invalidates the Project's cached Session runtimes (same effective-value semantics as a vault update): no hot swap into a run already in flight, but the next Task on any Session of the Project re-resumes and reads the new `api_key` / `base_url`. It additionally publishes a `credentials_updated` event to the Project's open Session channels (see Streaming below), and the models response carries `updatedAt` (the config file's mtime) — the Web App compares it against the last auth failure to decide whether an auth-dead composer should stay disabled.

### Agents

The paths below omit the `/api/projects/:projectId` prefix.

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET / POST | /agents | List / create Agents |
| DELETE | /agents/:agentId | Delete an Agent |
| GET / PUT | /agents/:agentId/config | Read / write config (AGENTS.md + system_config.yaml; PUT preserves YAML comments) |
| GET / PUT | /agents/:agentId/vault | Vault environment variables (values masked; PUT is a full replace) |
| GET | /agents/:agentId/export | Export the Agent State snapshot (tar.gz download) |
| POST | /agents/:agentId/import | Import a snapshot: `{dataBase64, confirm?}`; 409 on version conflict without confirm |
| GET / POST | /agents/:agentId/skills | List / install installed Skills |
| DELETE | /agents/:agentId/skills/:name | Uninstall a Skill |
| GET | /agents/:agentId/benchmarks | Benchmark scoring data (read-only) |

### Schedules

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET / POST | /agents/:agentId/schedules | List scheduled tasks / create one (409 if the name exists) |
| GET / PUT / DELETE | /agents/:agentId/schedules/:name | Read / update / delete a single task |

Schedule writes are owner-only. A task in new-Session mode carries `modelId` and `provider` together or not at all; the pair is checked against the Project's model table when the task is saved and again when the scheduler reconciles it.

### Session Creation and Directory Browsing

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | /agents/:agentId/sessions | List Sessions (including run state) |
| POST | /agents/:agentId/sessions | Create a Session: `{modelId?, provider?, workspace?, approvalMode?}` → 201 |
| GET | /dirs?path= | Server-side directory browser (backs the Workspace picker) |

On Session creation, `modelId` and `provider` are both-or-neither: send the complete pair to pick a model, or omit both to take the Project's default model — one without the other is a 400. The Workspace defaults to an auto-created temporary workspace, and the approval mode defaults to `allow-all`.

### Usage and Traces (Agent Level)

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | /usage | Usage statistics; query parameters `from`, `to`, `groupBy`, `agentId`, `provider`, `modelId` |
| GET | /usage/errors | One page of the error detail table (newest first): `offset`, `limit`, plus the same `from` / `to` / `agentId` filter → `{items, total}` |
| GET | /agents/:agentId/traces | Date → Session drill-down structure of Trace files |
| GET | /agents/:agentId/traces/:sessionId/:index | Read Trace events (`offset` / `limit` pagination) |
| GET | /agents/:agentId/traces/:sessionId/:index/analysis | Trace performance analysis |
| GET | /agents/:agentId/traces/:sessionId/:index/download | Download the raw Trace file (JSONL attachment) |
| POST | /agents/:agentId/traces/import | Import a Trace file: `{dataBase64}` → `{sessionId, index, date}` |

Trace download is available to any member; import is owner-only (like the Agent snapshot import, capped at 14MB). An imported file must be valid Trace JSONL whose first record is a `session_meta` with a filename-safe `session_id`; a session id the Agent already has is rejected (409 `trace_session_exists`), so an imported file always becomes index 001 of a new Session, landing in the local date directory of its first record's timestamp.

### Session-Level Endpoints

The paths below omit the `/api/sessions/:sessionId` prefix. For the storage model behind Sessions and Traces, see [Sessions and Traces](/sessions-and-traces).

| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | / | Session info (the single-session GET additionally carries `tracePath`, the absolute path of the latest Trace file; list rows omit it) |
| PATCH | / | Update: `{approvalMode?, archived?, title?}` |
| DELETE | / | Delete the Session (along with its Traces and scratch files) |
| GET | /messages | Full OmniMessage history; while a Task runs the response also carries `live` (the in-progress stream tail, see below) |
| GET | /stream | SSE event stream (next section) |
| POST | /tasks | Start a Task: `{input: TaskInputPart[], thinkingLevel?, queueIfBusy?}` → 202. With `queueIfBusy`, a busy session holds the input as a follow-up (`queued: true`) and auto-starts it as an ordinary next task once idle; `task_state` events report the queued count. `file` input parts are written to the Session scratchpad and handed to the model as `[attached file: <path>]` lines (see the request body below). With `goal: {budget?}` the input starts a goal loop instead: it must carry non-empty text (an image alone states no objective), any images it carries fold into the objective as scratchpad path lines whatever the model's vision, and `file` parts are refused — nothing folds them into a re-injected objective — see [Goal mode](/docs/goal-mode) |
| POST | /steer | Mid-run steering: `{text, images?}` queues a message for the running Task (delivered between turns as a standalone `[user_steering]` user message, with its images right behind it) → 202; either field can carry the message on its own, but a request with neither is a 400; 409 `not_running` when no Task is in progress |
| POST | /approvals/:toolCallId | Approval decision: `{decision}` is `allow` or `deny` → 204 |
| POST | /abort | Interrupt the current Task: 202 when triggered, 204 when idle |
| POST | /retry-now | "Retry now" on the reconnect countdown: skips the in-progress backoff wait, firing the next retry immediately (attempt counter unchanged) → 200 `{skipped}` — `skipped:false` is the benign "no wait in progress" case, never an error |
| POST | /compact | Trigger context compaction: 202; 409 `nothing_to_compact` when there is nothing to compact |
| GET | /files?path= | Browse the Workspace directory |
| GET | /files/content?path=&download=&preview= | Read a Workspace file (`download=1` serves it as an attachment, `preview=1` renders it in a sandbox — see below) |
| GET | /files/preview-redirect?path= | "Open in a new tab" for html: mints a signed token and 302s to the separate preview origin |
| POST | /files/stat | Batch existence check: `{paths}` |
| PUT | /files/content?path= | Upload a file: `{dataBase64}`, capped at 14MB |
| GET | /traces | List this Session's Trace files |
| GET | /traces/:index | Read Trace events (paginated) |
| GET | /traces/:index/analysis | Trace performance analysis |
| GET | /scratchpad/:fileName | Read a session scratch file (e.g. input images, file attachments) |

General conventions: Sessions the user cannot access always return 404 — their existence is never leaked; only one Task or compaction runs per Session at a time, and conflicts return 409 (`task_in_progress` / `compacting`).

#### The `live` field on GET /messages

The Trace stores only complete messages (streaming `partial_*` never reaches disk), so history alone cannot show a message that is still streaming. While the Session is running or compacting, the messages response therefore also carries the in-progress stream tail:

```ts
interface MessagesResponse {
  messages: OmniMessage[];
  live?: {
    // The Session channel's most recently assigned SSE event id (`<epoch>-<seq>`):
    // every event published up to and including this id is already reflected in `fragments`.
    cursor: string;
    // One synthetic `partial_* start` OmniMessage per open streaming fragment, whose
    // payload carries the full accumulated content so far (text/thinking prefix,
    // tool-call name + accumulated arguments, tool-output prefix + images), with the
    // original `origin` chain preserved (subagent fragments included).
    fragments: OmniMessage[];
  };
}
```

`cursor` and `fragments` are captured atomically before the trace read starts. A client using the connect-first pattern (below) applies them after history: when the cursor's epoch matches the epoch of the SSE events it has buffered, it drops every buffered **partial** event with seq ≤ cursor (their content is already accumulated inside `fragments`), feeds `fragments` through its normal reducer, then replays the rest of the buffer. Buffered **complete** messages are never dropped by the cursor — the regular overlap dedup decides for them. `live` is omitted while idle.

Workspace files may be Agent-generated, so `GET /files/content` treats them as untrusted: every response carries `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and the rest of the headers depend on the two flags (`download=1` wins over `preview=1`):

| Query | Content-Type | Content-Disposition | Content-Security-Policy |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| neither | `text/plain; charset=utf-8` for `.html` / `.htm` / `.svg`, the real type otherwise | `inline` | — |
| `preview=1` | the real type (`text/html`, `image/svg+xml`, …) | `inline` | `sandbox allow-scripts allow-popups allow-modals allow-forms`, sent only for `.html` / `.htm` / `.svg` |
| `download=1` | the real type | `attachment` | — |

`GET /scratchpad/:fileName` serves the same kind of untrusted bytes (uploads and Agent-written temp files) and is locked down the same way, without the flags: `nosniff` always, a fixed allowlist of five inert image types (`.png` / `.jpg` / `.jpeg` / `.gif` / `.webp`) served inline for the conversation's `<img>` tags, and everything else `application/octet-stream` with `Content-Disposition: attachment` — so nothing that isn't one of those images can render as a document on the App's origin.

The filename always rides along as `filename*=UTF-8''` with percent-encoding. `preview=1` is where the preview redirect falls back when no separate preview origin is available: the document keeps its real type and does render and run, but the sandbox deliberately omits `allow-same-origin`, so it lands in an opaque origin and can reach neither this origin's cookies nor the API. That isolation is also why `localStorage`, `document.cookie` and third-party embeds do not work there.

### Preview on a separate origin

Both the Files panel's rendered HTML view (an iframe) and "open in a new tab" go through `GET /files/preview-redirect?path=`, which authenticates the caller, then mints a short-lived HMAC token and 302s to a **different origin**:

```text
GET  /api/sessions/:sessionId/files/preview-redirect?path=index.html
302  Location: http://localhost:7364/preview/<token>/index.html
GET  /preview/<token>/<relative path>          (unauthenticated; the token is the credential)
```

- **Why a separate origin.** The page needs a real origin to have working storage, cookies and third-party embeds — but it must not be the app's origin, or Agent-written HTML would run with the session cookie. Locally the app is canonicalized onto `localhost` and previews are served from `127.0.0.1`; cookies are keyed by host and ignore port, so those are separate cookie jars while a second port would not be. Otherwise `PENGUIN_PREVIEW_ORIGIN` applies; with neither (a wildcard or non-loopback bind, or the variable unset), the redirect falls back to the same-origin sandbox above and `previewIsolated` on `GET /api/me` reports `false` so the UI can say so first.
- **In-app rendering rides the same URL.** The Files panel embeds the redirect URL in an iframe sandboxed with `allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-modals allow-downloads` — `allow-same-origin` grants the preview origin's identity, not the App's, so this stays strictly tighter than the sandbox-free new tab. Without a separate preview origin the panel instead falls back to inline `srcdoc` rendering (`allow-scripts` only, plus an in-memory storage shim), where relative subresources cannot load. Note that some browsers partition or block storage inside a cross-site iframe, so a page may behave slightly differently in the panel than in the top-level tab.
- **The preview host serves only `/preview/*`.** It is the same process as the app, so it answers `/api` with `401` and `302`s every other route to the canonical app host. A session cookie is therefore never set or honored on the preview host, and Agent HTML there cannot reach the API same-origin. (For a deployed `PENGUIN_PREVIEW_ORIGIN`, the reverse proxy must enforce the equivalent: route only `/preview/*` to the app on that origin.)
- **Path-based, not a query parameter**, so a page's relative subresources (`app.js`, `style.css`, images) resolve against the document and load under the same token.
- **The token binds the Session, the preview host and an expiry.** The host binding is load-bearing: the same process also answers on the app origin, so `/preview/...` refuses to serve there — otherwise it would be a same-origin XSS. Access is read-only and scoped to that Session's Workspace, and the path is re-resolved server-side, so `..` and symlink escapes are rejected as before.
- **Responses carry `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer`**, or the token-bearing URL would leak through `Referer` to every third party the page embeds — a risk that exists precisely because embeds now work.
- Bad token, expired token, wrong host and out-of-bounds path all answer a bare 404: the endpoint is unauthenticated and must not confirm what exists.

Key request bodies (explicit keys):

```ts
// POST /api/sessions/:sessionId/tasks — start a Task
interface TaskCreateRequest {
  input: TaskInputPart[];
  // Thinking level for this Task (a per-turn parameter, one of the five names; 400 otherwise);
  // omitted = falls back to the Agent config
  thinkingLevel?: "none" | "low" | "medium" | "high" | "xhigh";
}
type TaskInputPart =
  | { type: "text"; text: string }
  | { type: "image_url"; imageUrl: string }    // pasted images arrive as data URLs
  // File attachment: base64 data: URL, ≤10MB each (413 file_too_large beyond that), at most 20
  // per request and 12MB of decoded bytes in total (413 too_many_files / payload_too_large;
  // all three are checked before anything is written). The server writes it into the Session
  // scratchpad and appends an `[attached file: <path>]` line to the message text — the model
  // opens the file by path. `fileName` carries no path separators; on disk it keeps its own
  // words (`报告 2026.pdf` → `报告-2026.pdf`: non-ASCII survives, shell-hostile ASCII becomes
  // `-`), so a name is readable in the message and safe to paste into a command.
  | { type: "file"; fileName: string; dataUrl: string };

// POST /api/sessions/:sessionId/approvals/:toolCallId
interface ApprovalDecisionRequest {
  decision: "allow" | "deny";
}
```

The Web's `/model` switch has no dedicated endpoint: like the `/agent` handoff, it composes the ordinary APIs above — session creation opens a new Session for the same Agent (the chosen model, the source Workspace carried over), then POST /tasks sends a first message opening with a `[model_switch_from]` source block (the source session id, its `tracePath`, the Workspace, and the previous model pair); the model reads that Trace file itself when it needs the earlier history.

## Streaming (SSE)

Real-time delivery uses Server-Sent Events, not WebSocket, on two channels (the ordering semantics of what the channels carry are on [Message Flow & Ordering](/message-flow)):

| Channel | Path | Contents |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Per Session | GET /api/sessions/:sessionId/stream | The Session's message stream and run events |
| Per user | GET /api/events | `hello` handshake and cross-Session notifications (schedule_fired / schedule_queued / session_created) |

### Wire Format

Default (unnamed) SSE events carry raw OmniMessage envelopes as single-line JSON — the same protocol the SDK yields and the Trace stores, see the [OmniMessage Protocol](/omni-message). Events named `server_event` carry the ServerEvent union:

```ts
export type ServerEvent =
  | { type: "approval_request"; toolCall: OmniMessage<ToolCallPayload>; origin?: string[] }
  | { type: "task_state"; state: "idle" | "running" | "compacting" }
  | { type: "session_title"; sessionId: string; title: string }
  | { type: "resync_required" }
  | { type: "credentials_updated" }
  | { type: "hello" }
  | { type: "session_created"; projectId: string; agentId: string; sessionId: string; source: SessionSource }
  | { type: "schedule_fired"; projectId: string; agentId: string; name: string; sessionId: string }
  | { type: "schedule_queued"; projectId: string; agentId: string; name: string; sessionId: string };
```

| Event | Fired when |
| --- | --- |
| approval_request | A tool call escalated to human approval: every call under always-ask, plus rw / unknown-permission calls under read-only; pending approvals are resent on reconnect |
| task_state | The Session's run state flips (idle / running / compacting) |
| session_title | The model-generated title after the first turn has been persisted |
| resync_required | The Last-Event-ID was evicted from the buffer; the client must refetch history |
| credentials_updated | The Project's model credentials changed (`PUT /models`): cached runtimes were invalidated, so the client clears any auth-dead composer state |
| hello | Handshake on the user channel |
| session_created | A new Session was registered (e.g. a subagent session) |
| schedule_fired | A scheduled task fired and was delivered |
| schedule_queued | The target Session is running; this firing was queued |

### Delivery Guarantees

- Event ids are monotonic per channel, shaped `<epoch>-<seq>`;
- Each channel keeps a bounded replay buffer (most recent 10,000 events or 8MB);
- Reconnecting with `Last-Event-ID` replays the gap on a buffer hit; on a miss the server first sends `resync_required`, and the client refetches `/messages` before continuing;
- A heartbeat comment line is written every 20 seconds;
- Event order: on a reconnect carrying `Last-Event-ID`, **the replayed gap (or `resync_required`) arrives first**, then the initial events — the authoritative `task_state` snapshot and still-pending approval_requests — then the live stream. A fresh connection (no `Last-Event-ID`) skips replay, so its first event is the `task_state` snapshot.

### Recommended Client Pattern

The order the bundled Web App uses:

1. Connect `/stream` first and buffer incoming events;
2. GET `/messages` for the full history;
3. If the response carries `live` (a Task is running), drop the buffered partials the cursor already covers and seed the `live.fragments` on top of history — the in-progress message reappears with its streamed prefix intact;
4. Replay the buffer, deduplicating the overlap;
5. Go live.

## Type Imports

All DTO types are importable type-only from the server package's `@prismshadow/penguin-server/api` subpath:

```ts
import type { ServerEvent, SessionInfo } from "@prismshadow/penguin-server/api";
```
